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Re: State v. Mayfleld - Case No. 950835-CA
To the Clerk:
This letter is submitted pursuant to Rule 24(j) Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure to
advise the Court that the United States Supreme Court has recently decided a case which may
have significant bearing on the appeal in this matter. The case is Oraelas v. U.S., No. 95-5257
(Argued March 26, 1996 - Decided May 28, 1996)(a copy of which is attached hereto).
Ornelas held that "[ajppellate courts should perform de novo review of trial court
determinations of reasonable suspicion to make stops and probable cause to make warrantless
searches, after reviewing findings of historical fact for clear error and giving due weight to
inferences, based on local conditions, drawn from those facts by resident judges and local law
enforcement officers."
If there are any questions please contact my office. Thank you.

Sincerely,

a

MICHAEL D. BOUWHUIS
Attorney at Law
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OPINION ANNOUNCED
The Supreme Court

decided:
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CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE—Search and Seizure
Appellate courts should perform de novo review of trial court
determinations of reasonable suspicion to make stops and probable cause to make warrantless searches, after reviewing findings of historical fact for clear error and giving due weight to
inferences, based on local conditions, drawn from those facts by
resident judges and local law enforcement officers. (Ornelas v.
U.S., No. 95-5257)
Page 4373

F u l l T e x t of O p i n i o n
No 95-5257

SAUL ORNELAS AND ISMAEL ORNELASLEDESMA, PETITIONERS v.
UNITED STATES
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT
OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
Syllabus
No. 95-5257. Argued March 26, 1996—Decided May 28, 1996
In denying petitioners' motion to suppress cocaine found in their car,
the District Court ruled that the police had reasonable suspicion to
stop and question petitioners, and probable cause to remove one of
the interior panels where a package containing the cocaine was
found. The Court of Appeals ultimately affirmed both determinations, reviewing each "deferentially," and "for clear error," and
finding no clear error in either instance.
Held: The ultimate questions of reasonable suspicion to stop and
probable cause to make a warrantless search should be reviewed de
novo. The principal components of either inquiry are (1) a determination of the historical facts leading up to the stop or search, and
(2) a decision on the mixed question of law and fact whether the
historical facts, viewed from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable police officer, amount to reasonable suspicion or to probable
cause. Independent appellate review of the latter determination is
consistent with the position taken by this Court, see, e.g., Brinegar
v. United States, 338 U. S. 160, 160; will prevent unacceptably
varied results based on the interpretation of similar facts by different trial judges, see id., at 171; is necessary if appellate courts are
to maintain control of, and to clarify, the pertinent legal rules, see
Miller v. Fenton, 474 U. S. 104, 114; and will tend to unify precedent and to provide police with a denned set of rules which, in most
NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (hcadnote) will be released, as is
being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The
syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has be«n
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See
United Slates v. Detroit Lumber Co., 200 U.S. 321, 337.
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instdiK&M^Wtigageyit possible to^Veach a correct determination
' Se!o1r^attd«-a*^ jp^e.ther^^
of privacy is justified in the
interest of law enforcement,'S6ST&?.-, • New York v. Belton, 453 U. S.
454, 458. However, a reviewing court should take care both to
review findings of historical fact only for clear error and to give due
weight to inferences drawn therefrom by resident judges, who view
such facts in light of the community's distinctive features and
events, and by local police, who view the facts through the lens of
their experience and expertise.
16 F. 3d 714 and 52 F. 3d 328, vacated and remanded.
REHNQUTST, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
STEVENS, O'CONNOR, KENNEDY, SOUTER, THOMAS, GINSBURG,

and

BREYER, JJ., joined. SCALIA, J., filed a dissenting opinion.

CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the
Court.
Petitioners each pleaded guilty to possession of cocaine
with intent to distribute. They reserved their right to
appeal the District Court's denial of their motion to
suppress the cocaine found in their car. The District
Court had found reasonable suspicion to stop and
question petitioners as they entered their car, and
probable cause to remove one of the interior panels
where a package containing two kilos of cocaine was
found. The Court of Appeals opined that the findings of
reasonable suspicion to stop, and probable cause to
search, should be reviewed "deferentially, n and "for clear
error." We hold that the ultimate questions of reasonable suspicion and probable cause to make a warrantless
search should be reviewed de novo.
The facts are not disputed. In the early morning of a
December day in 1992, Detective Michael Pautz, a 20year veteran of the Milwaukee County SherifFs Department with 2 years specializing in drug enforcement, was
conducting drug-interdiction surveillance in downtown
Milwaukee. Pautz noticed a 1981 two-door Oldsmobile
with California license plates in a motel parking lot.
The car attracted Pautz's attention for two reasons:
because older model, two-door General Motors cars are
a favorite with drug couriers because it is easy to hide
things in them; and because California is a "source
State" for drugs. Detective Pautz radioed his dispatcher
to inquire about the car's registration. The dispatcher
informed Pautz that the owner was either Miguel
Ledesma Ornelas or Miguel Ornelas Ledesma from San
Jose, California; Pautz was unsure which name the
dispatcher gave. Detective Pautz checked the motel
registry and learned that an Ismael Ornelas accompanied by a second man had registered at 4:00 a.m.,
without reservations.
NOTICE: These opinions are subject to formal revision before publication in
the preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United Stales, Washington, D.C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that
corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

Copvn&it C 1996 bv The Bureau of Natumal Affairs. Inc.
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Pautz called for his partner, Donald Hurrle;, a detective with approximately 25 years of law enforcement
experience, assigned for the past 6 years to the drug
enforcement unit. When Hurrle arrived at the scene,
t h e officers contacted the local .office of the Drug
Enforcement Administration (DEA) and asked b E A
personnel to run the names Miguel Ledesma Ornelas
and Ismael Ornelas through the Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs Information System (NADDIS X a federal
database of known and suspected drug traffickers. Both
names appeared in NADDIS.
The NADDIS report
identified Miguel Ledesma Ornelas as .a heroin dealer
from El Centro, California, and Ismael Ornelas, Jr. as
a cocaine dealer from Tucson, Arizona. The officers then
summoned Deputy Luedke and the department's drugsniffing dog, Merlin. Upon their arrival, Detective Pautz
left for another assignment. Detective Hurrle informed
Luedke of what they knew and together they waited.
Sometime later, petitioners emerged from the motel
and got into the Oldsmobile. Detective Hurrle approached the car, identified himself as a police officer,
and inquired whether they had any illegal drugs or
contraband. Petitioners answered "No." Hurrle then
asked for identification and was given two California
driver's licenses bearing the names Saul Ornelas and
Ismael Ornelas. Hurrle asked them if he could search
the car and petitioners consented. The men appeared
calm, but Ismael was shaking somewhat.
Deputy
Luedke, who over the past nine years had searched
approximately 2,000 cars for narcotics, searched the
Oldsmobile's interior. He noticed that a panel above the
right rear passenger armrest felt somewhat loose and
suspected that the panel might have been removed and
contraband hidden inside. Luedke would testify later
t h a t a screw in the door jam adjacent to the loose panel
was rusty, which to him meant that the screw had been
removed at some time. Luedke dismantled the panel
and discovered two kilograms of cocaine. Petitioners
were arrested.
Petitioners filed pretrial motions to suppress, alleging
t h a t the police officers violated their Fourth Amendment
rights when the officers detained them in the parking
lot and when Deputy Luedke searched inside the panel
without a warrant. 1 The Government conceded in the
court below that when the officers approached petitioners in the parking lot, a reasonable person would not
have felt free to leave, so the encounter was an investigatory stop. See 16 F. 3d 714, 716 (CA7 1994). An
investigatory stop is permissible under the Fourth
Amendment if supported by reasonable suspicion, Terry
v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968), and a warrantless search of
a car is valid if based on probable cause, California v.
Acevedo, 500 U. S. 565, 569-570 (1991).
After conducting an evidentiary hearing, the Magist r a t e Judge concluded that the circumstances gave the

Petitioners also alleged that they had not given their consent to
search the interior of the car. The Magistrate Judge rejected this claim,
finding that the record "clearly established] consent to search the
Oldsmobile" and that "neither [petitioner] placed any restrictions on the
areas the officers could search." App. 21. The Magistrate ruled that this
consent did not give the officers authority to search inside the panel,
however, because under Seventh Circuit precedent the police may not
dismantle the car body during an otherwise valid search unless the police
have probable cause to believe the car's panels contain narcotics. See
United States v. Garcia, 897 F. 2d 1413, 1419-1420 (1990). We assume
correct the Circuit's limitation on the scope of consent only for purposes
of this decision.
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officers reasonable suspicion, but not probable cause.
The Magistrate found, as a finding of fact, that there
was no rust on the screw and hence concluded that
Deputy Luedke had an insufficient basis to conclude that
drugs would be found within the panel. The Magistrate
nonetheless recommended that the District Court deny
the suppression motions because he thought, given the
presence of the drug-sniffing dog, that the officers would
have found the cocaine by lawful means eventually and
therefore the drugs were admissible under the inevitable
discovery doctrine. See Nix v. Williams, 467 U. S. 431
(1984).
The District Court adopted the Magistrate's recommendation with respect to reasonable suspicion, but not its
reasoning as to probable cause. The District Court
thought that the model, age, and source-State origin of
the car, and the fact that two men traveling together
checked into a motel at 4 o'clock in the morning without
reservations, formed a drug-courier profile and t h a t this
profile together with the NADDIS reports gave rise to
reasonable suspicion of drug-trafficking activity; in
the court's view, reasonable suspicion became probable
cause when Deputy Luedke found the loose panel. Accordingly, the court ruled that the cocaine need not be
excluded. 2
The Court of Appeals reviewed deferentially the
District Court's determinations of reasonable suspicion
and probable cause; it would reverse only upon a finding
of "clear error."3 16 F. 3d, at 719. The court found no
clear error in the reasonable-suspicion analysis and
affirmed that determination. Ibid. With respect to the
probable-cause finding, however, the court remanded the
case for a determination on whether Luedke was
credible when testifying about the loose panel. Id., at
721-722.
On remand, the Magistrate Judge expressly found the
testimony credible. The District Court accepted the
finding, and once again ruled that probable cause
supported the search. The Seventh Circuit held that
determination not clearly erroneous.
Judgt. order
reported at 52 F. 3d 328 (1995).
We granted certiorari to resolve the conflict among the
Circuits over the applicable standard of appellate review.
516 U. S.
(1996).4
Articulating precisely what "reasonable suspicion" and
"probable cause" mean is not possible.
They are
commonsense, nontechnical conceptions that deal with
^The District Court emphasized twice that it did not reject the
Magistrate's recommendation with respect to the inevitable discovery
doctrine. App. 30-31, and n. 2; id, at 43-44. But on appeal the Government did not defend the seizure on this alternative ground and the
Seventh Circuit considered the argument waived. Id., at 71-72.
3
While the Seventh Circuit uses the term "clear error1' to denote the
deferential standard applied when reviewing determinations of reasonable suspicion or probable cause, we think the preferable term is "abuse
of discretion." See Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U. S. 552, 558 (1988).
"Clear error" is a term of art derived from Rule 52(a) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, and applies when reviewing questions of fact.
4
Compare, e.g., United States v. Puerta, 982 F. 2d 1297, 1300 (CA9
1992) (de novo review); United States v. Ramos, 933 F. 2d 968,972 (CA11
1991) {de novo review), cert, denied, 503 U. S. 908 (1992); United States
v. Patrick, 899 F. 2d 169, 171 (CA2 1990) (de novo review) with United
States v. Spears, 965 F. 2d 262, 268-271 (CA7 1992) (clear error).
The United States, in accord with petitioners, contends that a de novo
standard of review should apply to determinations of probable cause and
reasonable suspicion. We therefore invited Peter D. IsakofT to brief and
argue this case as amicus curiae in support of the judgment below. 516
U. S.
(1996). Mr. IsakofT accepted the appointment and has well
fulfilled his assigned responsibility.
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" 'the factual and practical considerations of everyday life
on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, a c t . " Illinois v. Gates, 462 U. S. 213, 231 (1983)
(quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U. S. 160, 176
(1949)); see United States v. Sokolow, 490 U. S. 1, 7-8
(1989). As such, the standards are "not readily, or even
usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules." Gates,
supra, at 232. We have described reasonable suspicion
simply as "a particularized and objective basis" for
suspecting the person stopped of criminal activity,
United States v. Cortez, 449 U. S. 411, 417-418 (1981),
and probable cause to search as existing where the
known facts and circumstances are sufficient to warrant
a man of reasonable prudence in the belief that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found, see Brinegar,
supra, at 175-176; Gates, supra, at 238. We have
cautioned that these two legal principles are not "finelytuned standards," comparable to the standards of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt or of proof by a preponderance of the evidence. Gates, supra, at 235. They are
instead fluid concepts that take their substantive content
from the particular contexts in which the standards are
being assessed. Gates, supra, at 232; Brinegar, supra,
at 175 ( T h e standard of proof [for probable cause] is
. . . correlative to what must be proved"); Ker v. California, 374 U. S. 23, 33 (1963) ("This Courft] [has a] longestablished recognition that standards of reasonableness
under the Fourth Amendment are not susceptible of
Procrustean application"; "[e]ach case is to be decided on
its own facts and circumstances" (internal quotation
marks omitted)); Terry v. Ohio, supra, at 29 (the limitations imposed by the Fourth Amendment "will have to
be developed in the concrete factual circumstances of
individual cases").
The principal components of a determination of
reasonable suspicion or probable cause will be the events
which occurred leading up to the stop or search, and
then the decision whether these historical facts, viewed
from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable police
officer, amount to reasonable suspicion or to probable
cause. The first part of the analysis involves only a
determination of historical facts, but the second is a
mixed question of law and fact: "[T]he historical facts
are admitted or established, the rule of law is undisputed, and the issue is whether the facts satisfy the
[relevant] statutory [or constitutional] standard, or to
p u t ' i t another way, whether the rule of law as applied
to the established facts is or is not violated." PullmanStandard v. Swint, 456 U. S. 273, 289, n. 19 (1982).
We think independent appellate review of these
ultimate determinations of reasonable suspicion and
probable cause is consistent with the position we have
taken in past cases. We have never, when reviewing a
probable-cause or reasonable-suspicion determination
ourselves, expressly deferred to the trial court's determination.
See, e.g., Brinegar, supra (rejecting district
court's conclusion that the police lacked probable cause);
Alabama v. White, 496 U. S. 325 (1990) (conducting
independent review and finding reasonable suspicion).
A policy of sweeping deference would permit, u[i]n the
absence of any significant difference in the facts," "the
Fourth Amendment's incidence [to] tur[n] on whether
different trial judges draw general conclusions that
the facts are sufficient or insufficient to constitute
probable cause." Brinegar, supra, at 171. Such varied
results would be inconsistent with the idea of a unitary
system of law. This, if a matter-of-course, would be
unacceptable.
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In addition, the legal rules for probable cause and
reasonable suspicion acquire content only through
application. Independent review is therefore necessary
if appellate courts are to maintain control of, and to
clarify the legal principles. See Miller v. Fenton, 474
U. S. 104, 114 (1985) (where the "relevant legal principle
can be given meaning only through its application to the
particular circumstances of a case, the Court has been
reluctant to give the trier of fact's conclusions presumptive force and, in so doing, strip a federal appellate
court of its primary function as an expositor of law").
Finally, de novo review tends to unify precedent and
will come closer to providing law enforcement officers
with a defined u 'set of rules which, in most instances,
makes it possible to reach a correct determination
beforehand as to whether an invasion of privacy is
justified in the interest of law enforcement.' " New York
v. Belton, 453 U. S. 454, 458 (1981); see also Thompson
v. Keohane, 516 U. S.
,
(1995) (slip op., at 16)
( u [T]he law declaration aspect of independent review
potentially may guide police, unify precedent, and
stabilize the law," and those effects "serve legitimate law
enforcement interests").
It is true that because the mosaic which is analyzed
for a reasonable-suspicion or probable-cause inquiry is
multi-faceted, "one determination will seldom be a useful
'precedent' for another," Gates, supra, at 238, n. 11. But
there are exceptions. For instance, the circumstances in
Brinegar, supra, and Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S.
132 (1925), were so alike that we concluded that
reversing the Circuit Court's decision in Brinegar was
necessary to be faithful to Carroll. Brinegar, supra, at
178 ("Nor . . . can we find in the present facts any
substantial basis for distinguishing this case from the
Carroll case"). We likewise recognized the similarity of
facts in United States v. Sokolow, 490 U. S. 1 (1989)
and Florida v. Royer, 460 U. S. 491 (1983) (in both
cases, the defendant traveled under an assumed name;
paid for an airline ticket in cash with a number of small
bills; traveled from Miami, a source city for illicit drugs;
and appeared nervous in the airport). The same was
true both in United States v. Ross, 456 U. S. 798 (1982)
and California v. Acevedo, 500 U. S. 565 (1991), see id.,
at 572 ("The facts in this case closely resemble the facts
in Ross"); and in United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U. S.
544 (1980), and Reid v. Georgia, 448 U. S. 438 (1980),
see id., at 443 (Powell, J., concurring) ("facts [in
Mendenhall] [are] remarkably similar to those in the
present case"). And even where one case may not
squarely control another one, the two decisions when
viewed together may usefully add to the body of law on
the subject.
The Court of Appeals, in adopting its deferential
standard of review here, reasoned that de novo review
for warrantless searches would be inconsistent with the
"'great deference'" paid when reviewing a decision to
issue a warrant, see Illinois v. Gates, 462 U. S. 213
(1983). See United States v. Spears, 965 F. 2d 262,
269-271 (CA7 1992). We cannot agree. The Fourth
Amendment demonstrates a "strong preference for
searches conducted pursuant to a warrant," Gates, supra,
at 236, and the police are more likely to use the
warrant process if the scrutiny applied to a magistrate's
probable-cause determination to issue a warrant is less
than t h a t for warrantless searches. Were we to eliminate this distinction, we would eliminate the incentive.
We therefore hold that as a general matter determina-
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be reviewed de novo on appeal Having said this, we
hasten to point out that a reviewing court should take
care both to review findings of historical fact only for
clear error and to give due weight to inferences drawn
from those facts by resident judges and local law
enforcement officers
A trial judge views the facts of a particular case m
light of the distinctive features and events of the
community, likewise a police officer views the facts
through the lens of his police experience and expertise
The background facts provide a context for the historical
facts, and when seen together yield inferences that
deserve deference For example, what may not amount
to reasonable suspicion at a motel located alongside a
transcontinental highway at the height of the summer
tourist season may rise to that level in December in
Milwaukee That city is unlikely to have been an overnight stop selected at the last minute by a traveler coming
from California to points east The 85-mile width of Lake
Michigan blocks any further eastward progress And while
t h e city's salubrious summer climate and seasonal
attractions bring many tourists at that time of year, the
same is not true in December
Milwaukee's average
daily high temperature m that month is 31 degrees and
its average daily low is 17 degrees, the percentage of
possible sunshine is only 38 percent It is a reasonable
inference that a Californian stopping in Milwaukee in
December is either there to transact business or to visit
family or friends The background facts, though rarely
the subject of explicit findings, inform the judge's
assessment of the historical facts
In a similar vein, our cases have recognized that a
police officer may draw inferences based on his own
experience in deciding whether probable cause exists
See, eg, United States v Ortiz, 422 U S 891, 897
(1975) To a layman the sort of loose panel below the
back seat arm rest in the automobile involved in this
case may suggest only wear and tear, but to Officer
Luedke, who had searched roughly 2,000 cars for
narcotics, it suggested t h a t drugs may be secreted inside
the panel An appeals court should give due weight to
a trial court's finding t h a t the officer was credible and
the inference was reasonable
We vacate the judgments and remand the case to the
Court of Appeals to review de novo the District Court's
determinations that the officer had reasonable suspicion
and probable cause in this case
It is so ordered

JUSTICE SCALIA, dissenting
The Court today decides that a district court's determinations whether there was probable cause to justify a
warrantless search and reasonable suspicion to make an
investigatory stop should be reviewed de novo We have
in the past reviewed some mixed questions of law and
fact on a de novo basis, and others on a deferential
basis, depending upon essentially practical consider
ations Because, with respect to the questions at issue
here, the purpose of the determination and its extremely
fact-bound nature will cause de novo review to have
relatively little benefit, it is in my view unwise to
require courts of appeals to undertake the searching
inquiry that standard requires
I would affirm the
itjfrmpnt nf the Court of Appeals
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As the Court recognizes, determinations of probable
cause and reasonable suspicion involve a two-step
process First, a court must identify all of the relevant
historical facts known to the officer at the time of the
stop or search, and second, it must decide whether,
under a standard of objective reasonableness, those facts
would give rise to a reasonable suspicion justifying a
stop or probable cause to search
See ante, at 6^-7
Because this second step requires application of an
objective legal standard to the facts, it is properly
characterized as a mixed question of law and fact See
ante, at 7, Pullman-Standard v Swmt, 456 U S 273,
289, n 19 (1982)
Merely labeling the issues "mixed questions," however,
does not establish that they receive de novo review
While it is well settled that appellate courts "accep[t]
findings of fact that are not 'clearly erroneous' but
decidfe] questions of law de novo," First Options of
Chicago, Inc v Kaplan, 514 U S
,
(1995) (slip
op , at 9), there is no rigid rule with respect to mixed
questions
We have said that "deferential review of
mixed questions of law and fact is warranted when it
appears that the district court is 'better positioned' than
the appellate court to decide the issue m question or
that probing appellate scrutiny will not contribute to the
clarity of legal doctrine"
Salve Regina College v
Russell, 499 U S 225, 233 (1991) (citing Miller v
Fenton, 47r4 U S 104, 114 (1985))
These primary factors that counsel in favor of deferential review of some mixed questions of law and
fact—expertise of the district court and lack of lawclanfying value in the appellate decision—are ordinarily
present with respect to determinations of reasonable
suspicion and probable cause
The factual details
bearing upon those determinations are often numerous
and (even when supported by uncontroverted police
testimony) subject to credibility determinations
An
appellate court never has the benefit of the district
court's intimate familiarity with the details of the
case—nor the full benefit of its hearing of the live
testimony, unless the district court makes specific
findings on the "totality of the circumstances" bearing
upon the stop or search As we recognized in Cooter &
Cell v Hartrnarx Corp, 496 U S 384 (1990), a case
holding that deferential (abuse-of discretion) review
should be applied to a district court's Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 11 determination that an attorney did
not conduct a reasonable inquiry or entertain a "substantiated belief regarding the nonfnvolousness of the
complaint, see id, at 393 a district court, "[fjamiliar
with the issues and litigants
is better situated than
the court of appeals to marshal the pertinent facts and
apply the fact-dependent legal standard
" Id , at
402
Moreover, as the Court acknowledges, "reasonable
suspicion" and "probable cause" are "commonsense,
nontechnical conceptions that deal with ' "the factual and
practical considerations of everyday life on which
reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians,
a c t " ' " Ante, at 5-6 (quoting Illinois v Gates, 462 U S
213, 231 (1983) (quoting Bnnegar v United States, 338
U S 160, 176 (1949))) Where a trial court makes such
commonsense determinations based on the totality of
circumstances, it is ordinarily accorded deference What
we said in a case concerning the question whether
certain payments were a "gift" excludable from income
under the Internal Revenue Code, is equally pertinent
here

5-28-96
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"Decision of the issue presented in these cases must
be based ultimately on the application of the factfinding tribunal's experience with the mainsprings of
human conduct to the totality of the facts of each
case. The nontechnical nature of the . . . standard,
the close relationship of it to the data of practical
human experience, and the multiplicity of relevant
factual elements, with their various combinations,
creating the necessity of ascribing the proper force
to each, confirm us in our conclusion that primary
weight in this area must be given to the conclusions
of the trier of fact." Commissioner v. Duberstein,
363 U. S. 278, 289 (1960).
With respect to the second factor counseling in favor of
deferential review, level of law-clarifying value in the
appellate decision: Law clarification requires generalization, and some issues lend themselves to generalization
much more than others. Thus, in Pierce v. Underwood,
487 U. S. 552, 562 (1988), a principal basis for our
applying an abuse-of-discretion standard to a district
court's determination that the United States' litigating
position was "substantially justified" within the meaning
of the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U. S. C. §2412(d),
was that the question was "a multifarious and novel
question, little susceptible, for the time being at least,
of useful generalization." Ibid. Probable cause and
reasonable suspicion determinations are similarly
resistant to generalization. As the Court recognizes,
these are "fluid concepts," a 'not readily, or even usefully,
reduced to a neat set of legal rules'"; and "because the
mosaic which is analyzed for a reasonable-suspicion or
probable-cause inquiry is multifaceted, 'one determination will seldom be a useful "precedent" for another.'"
Ante, at 6, 8 (quoting Illinois v. Gates, supra, at 232,
238, n. 11). The Court maintains that there will be
exceptions to this—that fact-patterns will occasionally
repeat themselves, so that a prior de novo appellate
decision will provide useful guidance in a similar case.
Ante, at 8-9.
I do not dispute that, but I do not
understand why we should allow the exception to frame
the rule. Here, as in Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470
U. S. 564, 574-575 (1985), "[duplication of the trial
judge's efforts in the court of appeals would very likely
contribute only negligibly to the accuracy of fact determination at a huge cost in diversion of judicial
resources."
The facts of this very case illustrate the futility of
attempting to craft useful precedent from the factintensive review demanded by determinations of probable cause and reasonable suspicion. On remand, in
conducting de novo review, the Seventh Circuit might
consider, inter alia, the following factors relevant to its
determination whether there was probable cause to
conduct a warrantless search and reasonable suspicion
justifying the investigatory stop: (i) the two NADDIS
tips; (ii) that the car was a 1981 two-door General
Motors product; (iii) that the car was from California, a
source state; (iv) that the car was in Milwaukee; (v) that
it was December; (vi) that one suspect checked into the
hotel at 4 a.m.; (vii) that he did not have reservations;
(viii) that he had one traveling companion; (ix) that one
suspect appeared calm but shaking; and (x) that there
was a loose panel in the car door. If the Seventh
Circuit were to find that this unique confluence of
factors supported probable cause and reasonable suspicion, the absence of any one of these factors in the next
- - U — j « ^ +v»^ nro^AHpnt inapplicable.

Of course, even when all of the factors are replicated,
use of a de novo standard as opposed to a deferential
standard will provide greater clarity only where the
latter would not suffice to set the trial court's conclusion
aside. For where the appellate court holds, on the basis
of deferential review, t h a t it was reversible error for a
district court to find probable cause or reasonable
suspicion in light of certain facts, it advances the clarity
of the law just as much as if it had reversed the district
court after conducting plenary review.
In the present case, an additional factor counseling
against de novo review must be mentioned: The prime
benefit of de novo appellate review in criminal cases is,
of course, to prevent a miscarriage of justice that might
result from permitting the verdict of guilty to rest upon
the legal determinations of a single judge. But the issue
in these probable-cause and reasonable-suspicion cases
is not innocence but deterrence of unlawful police
conduct. That deterrence will not be at all lessened if
the trial judge's determination, right or wrong, is
subjected to only deferential review.
The Court is wrong in its assertion, ante, at 9, that
unless there is a dual standard of review—deferential
review of a magistrate's decision to issue a warrant, and
de novo review of a district court's ex post facto approval
of a warrantless search—the incentive to obtain a
warrant would be eliminated. In United States v. Leon,
468 U. S. 897, 913 (1984), we held that "reliable
physical evidence seized by officers reasonably relying on
a warrant issued by a detached and neutral magistrate
. . . should be admissible in the prosecutor's case in
chief." Only a warrant can provide this assurance that
the fruits of even a technically improper search will be
admissible. Law enforcement officers would still have
ample incentive to proceed by warrant.
Finally, I must observe that the Court does not appear
to have the courage of its conclusions. In an apparent
effort to reduce the unproductive burden today's decision
imposes upon appellate courts, or perhaps to salvage
some of the trial court's superior familiarity with the
facts that it has cast aside, the Court suggests that an
appellate court should give "due weight" to a trial
court's finding that an officer's inference of wrongdoing
(i.e., his assessment of probable cause to search), was
reasonable. Ante, at 10. The Court cannot have it
both ways. This finding of "reasonableness" is precisely
what it has told us the appellate court must review de
novo; and in de novo review, the "weight due" to a trial
court's finding is zero. In the last analysis, therefore, the Court's opinion seems to me not only wrong but
contradictory.

* * *
I would affirm the judgment of the Seventh Circuit on
the ground t h a t it correctly applied a deferential
standard of review to the District Court's findings of
probable cause and reasonable suspicion.
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